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Abstract: 
While it is generally accepted in Science and Technology Studies that technological artefacts have 
an impact on human practices, the question how this impact is achieved has been answered 
idiosyncratically for each case studied. This gap between abstract theoretical conceptualisations of 
non-human agency and largely descriptive accounts of many empirical instances to which they are 
applied is difficult to overcome unless the agency of artefacts can be compared. The aim of this 
paper is to propose and test a theoretically grounded framework that enables comparisons of 
agential qualities of technologies. In order to compare the ways in which technologies influence 
human behaviour, technology needs to be positioned in social theory. We do so by arguing that 
technology is one of three distinct modes of exercising influence, positioning technology in a 
general framework of kinds and modes of influence, and utilising Akrich's notion of scripts to 
capture the mediation of influence as a particular property of technology. From this, we derive a 
framework for comparing scripts in seven dimensions. We apply this framework to a test of 
conflicting hypotheses about consequences of the increasing sophistication of technology and to 
the exploration of the complexity underlying a typology of ‘persuasive technologies’. Our ‘proof 
of concept’ enables the conclusion that comparative studies of technologies enable unique 
contributions to Science and Technology Studies as well as related fields like studies on techno-
regulation. 
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Zusammenfassung: 
Die Science and Technology Studies sind sich zwar darin einig, dass Technik menschliche 
Praktiken beeinflusst, geben jedoch bislang auf die Frage, wie das geschieht, für jeden untersuchten 
Fall eine idiosynkratische Antwort. Diese Lücke zwischen abstrakten Konzeptualisierungen nicht-
menschlicher Agency und Einzelfallbeschreibungen kann nicht überwunden werden, solange die 
Agency von Artefakten nicht verglichen werden kann. Das Ziel dieses Papers ist es, einen 
theoretisch begründeten Vergleichsrahmen für handlungsbeeinflussende Eigenschaften von 
Technik vorzuschlagen und zu testen. Um Formen der Beeinflussung menschlichen Verhaltens 
durch Technik vergleichen zu können, muss letztere in die Sozialtheorie eingeordnet werden. Wir 
tun das, indem wir Technik in einen allgemeinen Rahmen von Arten und Modi der Beeinflussung 
einordnen und Akrichs Konzept des Skripts für die Erfassung der handlungsbeeinflussenden 
Eigenschaften von Technik nutzen. Daraus entwickeln wir einen Vergleichsrahmen für Skripte mit 
sieben Dimensionen. Diesen Vergleichsrahmen wenden wir in einem Test einander 
widersprechender Hypothesen über Folgen einer steigenden Komplexität der Technik sowie in der 
Erkundung der Komplexität einer Typologie von ‚Beeinflussungstechnologien‘ an. Unsere 
‚Pilotstudie‘ gestattet die Schlussfolgerung, dass vergleichende Studien von Technologien 
neuartige Beiträge zu den Science and Technology Studies sowie zu angrenzenden Gebieten wie 
den Studien zur Techno-Regulation ermöglichen.  
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Techniksoziologie – Vergleichsrahmen – technische Skripte – Sozialtheorie – Agency von 
Artefakten 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we address a major obstacle to progress in the understanding of the agency of 
technology, namely the lack of frameworks for the comparative study of technologies and the ways 
in which they shape human practice. The analysis of the agency of technology is one of the major 
concerns of Science and Technology Studies (STS). However, while the question if technological 
artefacts have an impact on human practices is not under debate anymore, the question how this 
impact is achieved has been answered idiosyncratically for each case studied. This accumulation 
of many different answers to that question seems to make a synthesis impossible. The gap between 
abstract theoretical conceptualisations of non-human agency, e.g. in terms of Actor-Network-
Theory (ANT), and largely descriptive accounts of many empirical instances to which they are 
applied appears to be disappointingly stable. 
The recent turn to a ‘new materialism’ mostly rephrases the initial ‘if’ question of STS, but does 
not solve the problem of making the diverse ‘hows’ more comparable. The discussion of material 
agency keeps oscillating between abstract concepts developed in the 1980s and 1990s and 
individual descriptions of particular cases (Knappett and Malafouris 2008; Pickering and Guzik 
2008; Coole and Frost 2010), and we are hard pressed to find a systematic link between empirical 
case studies and abstract problems.   
We ascribe this gap to the inability to compare the agency of artefacts, i.e. to find 
commonalities of and differences between the ways in which artefacts shape actions. As Latour has 
emphasised, there is a difference between a stop-sign and a speed-bump, the second usually being 
more effective in influencing human behaviour (Latour 1992: 243-244). But which differences do 
produce this varying effectiveness? And how can these differences be properly considered in a 
framework that can be extended to other traffic-regulating technologies, let alone technologies with 
different purposes? These questions cannot be answered by simple references to weight and solidity 
of things. Comparing the ways in which technologies influence behaviour requires approaches that 
include materiality and acknowledge the complexity of both technology and human behaviour. 
We see four reasons why STS should find ways to compare technologies. First, the absence of 
a comparative framework for technologies circumvents to relate the findings of the abundant case 
studies on technical agency to each other. This not only corrupts any possibility of operating on 
and contributing to a shared state of the art, but also decouples the case studies from more general 
accounts of technological agency and thus significantly impedes an empirically driven or at least 
empirically informed development of concepts and theories. 
Second, a framework could inform case studies, which currently use ad-hoc descriptions that 
are ‘short-circuited’ with highly abstract concepts. This is what makes case studies idiosyncratic 
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and prevents them from serving to extend and inform theoretical discussions. Because the abstract 
concepts are not sensitive enough to detect differences in material agency, the specifics of technical 
agency in different situations are lost to them.  
Third, a comparative framework would support and connect more specific diagnoses of 
technology’s increasing role in creating and maintaining social order. The recent literature on 
“regulation by design” (Yeung 2008) or techno-regulation (Brownsword 2005) recognises that 
influence can be exercised through architecture and technological design. Scholars discuss how 
software code can be regarded as law (Lessig 1999), whether “techno-regulation” can be 
considered as regulation (Leenes 2011), and how this comparison applies to issues of legitimacy 
and democracy (Koops 2008; Hildebrandt 2011). Similar arguments are being developed in a 
discussion that is best termed ‘critical algorithm studies’, which discusses the possibility to shape 
human behaviour through algorithms (Barocas et al. 2013; Ziewitz 2016a; Kitchin 2017). Partly 
building on STS, these new discussions appear to be split between highly abstract arguments and 
an ad-hoc use of ‘sample technologies’ in very much the same way. Moving forward requires 
understanding the options accessible to regulators and designers, which in turn means that the 
regulative powers of technologies need to be compared to each other as well as to traditional forms 
of regulation by law. 
A fourth reason is a possible further contribution by STS to social theory. The social sciences 
have extensively studied the functioning and the effectiveness of instructions, rules, roles or norms 
in different types of social situations but have largely shied away so far from considering the 
ordering by technology as distinct and equifinal. Rendering technologies comparable through 
concepts at middle levels of abstraction may make it possible for the social sciences to tap into the 
wealth of STS knowledge on that topic. 
The aim of this paper is to propose and test a theoretically grounded framework that enables 
comparisons of agential qualities of technologies. This aim is rather specific in that it does not 
address many concerns of technology studies including the use of technological potential rather 
than the technology itself for influencing others (e.g. nuclear weapons), the role of technology in 
enhancing human action capabilities, the unpredictability or the variability of creative situational 
uses of technology. However, the comparison of agential qualities addresses one traditional line of 
research we believe to require methodological progress. 
The theoretical basis of our framework is the conceptualisation of technology as a medium 
through which human actors can be influenced, and of technologically mediated influence as a 
distinct mode of influence besides interactive and socio-structurally mediated influence. The 
concept ‘script’ that was proposed by (Akrich 1992) reflects the influence of technology designers 
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on technology users, and may thus serve as a basis for a comparative framework for technologies 
(2). We apply this framework to an exploration of the complexity underlying Fogg’s (2003) 
typology of “persuasive technologies” and to the test of conflicting hypotheses about consequences 
of the increasing sophistication of technology (3). Our discussion addresses the role of materiality 
in our framework (4). Conclusions concern possible contributions of comparative studies of 
technologies (5).  
2. Technology as a medium for influence  
The idea that technology is a medium through which human behaviour is influenced is a 
fundamental theoretical insight.2 However, the proponents of ANT have never embedded this 
insight in any general social theory of the shaping of human behaviour. As a consequence, the idea 
is difficult to use in connection with other approaches to the shaping of human behaviour. In order 
to compare the ways in which technologies influence human behaviour, technology needs to be 
positioned in social theory. We do so by arguing that technology is one of three distinct means of 
exercising influence and positioning technology in a general framework of kinds and modes of 
influence. We then utilise Akrich's notion of scripts to capture the mediation of influence as a 
particular property of technology and derive a comparative framework for scripts. 
2.1 The exercise of influence 
In order to theoretically ground our comparative framework, we use a generalised concept of 
influence. This requires a clarification of the relationship between the concepts ‘influence’ and 
‘power’. The second concept is more commonly used in sociology but has also been criticised for 
its ambiguity. Power is considered in sociology as a relationship between actors, which leads to the 
two interdependent perspectives on power as the ability to alter others’ behaviour and the ability to 
disobey. The first perspective can be traced back to Weber, who understood power as “any chance 
to enforce one’s will in a social relationship, if necessary against resistance and regardless of the 
basis on which this chance rests” (Weber 1976 [1922]: 28, our translation). To have power, then, is 
to be obeyed. This idea underlies the common definition of power “A has power over B to the 
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do“ (Dahl 1957: 202-203). 
The other perspective conceives power as not having to obey. This perspective has been emphasised 
                                                 
2 We use ‘medium’ here in the basic sense that it operates ‘in between’ different actors. The term medium connects to 
our theoretical frame, in which influence in society is facilitated through different forms of “generalized media” 
(Parsons 1963a). In line with STS, we do not conceive technology as a neutral medium, but as having a transformative 
capacity in social relations (Sayes 2014). 
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by Crozier and Friedberg (1980), who linked the opportunity of not having to obey to the control 
of a relevant zone of uncertainty.  
Both perspectives have in common that they use the concept ‘power’ in an encompassing 
sense, i.e. as including all ways of changing an actor’s behaviour or means of resisting such an 
attempted change. This broad use of the concept of power in sociology entails a “conceptual 
diffuseness” that has already been criticised by Parsons (1963b). 
“The effect of this diffuseness, as I call it, is to treat ‘influence’ and sometimes 
money, as well as coercion in various aspects, as ‘forms’ of power, thereby making 
it logically impossible to treat power as a specific mechanism operating to bring 
about changes in the action of other units, individual or collective, in the processes 
of social interaction.” (Parsons 1963b: 232, emphasis in original) 
As an alternative, Parsons proposes to conceptualise power as one of three “general mechanisms” 
or “generalised media” of social interaction through which an actor’s behaviour can be changed 
(Parsons 1963a). Power is placed beside influence and money.  
The idea of analysing attempts by actors to change other actors’ behaviour in terms of several 
distinct ways of interaction has recently been taken up by Schimank (2010). Schimank deviates 
from Parsons by using “influence” as the overarching concept for altering behaviour. He defines 
influence as the implementation of a behavioural expectation against the interests of the 
expectation’s addressee (we would add: if necessary), and distinguishes several kinds of influence 
(ibid: 267-304). Among these influences, ‘power’ is determined as coercion (influence based on 
force). In a scheme that reduces the kinds of influence to three, Gläser and Schimank (2014) 
complement power by inducement (influence based on resources) and persuasion (influence based 
on knowledge or values).  
For our purposes, Schimank’s approach has two advantages. First, while Parsons (1963a) 
associated specific generalised media with positive sanctions (money) and negative sanctions 
(power), Schimank suggests that all kinds of influence can be used for initiating and deterring 
human behaviour. Second, Gläser and Schimank distinguish two modes in which influence is 
exercised, namely influence through interaction and influence mediated by structures (Gläser and 
Schimank: 46). An actor can interactively influence others by e.g. issuing orders, providing or 
withdrawing rewards, or convincing them. The influence is structurally mediated if actors exercise 
influence by setting up rules of behaviour, designing reward procedures, or creating other 
structures.  
The distinction between influence through interaction and influence through structures 
provides the opportunity to introduce a third mode of, namely technologically mediated influence. 
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This mode is similar to mediation by structures but sufficiently different to warrant separate 
consideration.  
Our decision to position technology-mediated influence alongside structurally mediated 
influence rather than subordinating it as a specific case is based on the insight of STS that the 
materiality of technology makes a difference. If this is the case, subordinating technological to 
social structures obscures the conditions and consequences of exercising influence through material 
technology. We do not have to follow STS’s more radical arguments concerning the role of 
technology in order to apply this important contribution by STS to sociological theory. The three 
positions concerning technology that are currently discussed in STS are ANT’s symmetrical 
position (Callon 1986; Latour 2005), Latour’s (1991a) argument that material obduracy makes 
technology the primary factor that stabilises society, and a position assuming supremacy of social 
structures (Pinch 2008). These three positions have in common that they need to consider 
technological structures as distinct from social structures. Two important aspects of this distinctness 
are the materiality of technological structures and their existence independent of actors, which 
makes a difference at least in some social theories.  
Such a parallel treatment of material technological and social structures has been debated for 
a long time. The problem can be traced back to the emergence of sociology as a discipline, which 
required to defend the status of social causes against arguments that ascribed social differences to 
psychological, biological, or climatological factors (Grundmann and Stehr 1997: 87-91). In their 
fight for a space for sociology among the disciplines, “the classical sociologists ‘excluded’ the 
physical environment.” (Grundmann and Stehr 2000: 159). This observation was extended to 
material aspects of technology (Rammert 1998).  
Emphatically objecting to theoretical purifications that only consider social facts and thus 
disregard the material features of social order, sociologists and historians of technology argued that 
social order and dominance are inherently articulated through material artefacts (Mumford 1964; 
Linde 1972). Latour emphasised this interconnection between technology and society in his famous 
statement that “technology is society made durable” (Latour 1991). Latour did not simply equate 
social and technological structures based on their durable and constraining features but argued that 
social structures are made durable by the material base technology provides. While there is no 
complete agreement between these scholars, there are two common threads in their arguments. 
First, social order is at least partly created through technological structures. Second, it is created 
through technological structures in a particular way due to the structures’ materiality. 
This perspective is both crucial and contested with respect to social theory, as Orlikowski 
(1992; 2000) has argued in a precise application of structuration theory to the question of 
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technology, materiality, and structure. In structuration theory, (social) structures do not exist outside 
of human doings. They have to be enacted in order to be realised, which means that they are denied 
an independent existence outside of practice. If this approach to social structures is extended to 
technological structures, technologies must also be denied a capacity of embodying social 
structures in order to curtail a possible independent existence outside of practice. Orlikowski opts 
for this position by emphasising that structures should rather be seen as emergent from practice 
than as embodied in technologies. The conceptual appeal of this argument lies in the opportunity 
to position technology in social theory and opening up the use of technology to sociological 
analyses based on structuration or, more general, practice theory. However, these analyses are 
limited by enforcing the neglect of any intentional exercise of influence through technology. A 
contrasting position to Orlikowski would effectively entail stripping technologies of their 
materiality. This approach has the similar advantages of increased compatibility with social theory 
but comes at the price of an indistinguishability of technical and social structures or even the 
disappearance of technological content in favour of social structures (Button 1993). This approach 
severely limits the possibilities to deal analytically with the role of technology’s materiality, which 
has become untenable because STS has demonstrated that the materiality of technological 
structures makes a difference in human action. Taking technology into social theory thus easily 
leads into a conceptual dilemma. On the one side, technology cannot embody structures, because 
they have to be enacted in practice. On the other side, the structures can be simply detached from 
technology, because of their immaterial nature. Both sides struggle with the problem how 
materiality and structures are related in technologies and how this can be distinguished from “pure” 
social structures. 
The non-reducibility of technological to social structures argued by STS motivates our 
suggestion to introduce technologically mediated influence as a third kind of influence beside 
interaction and influence mediated by social structures. If it is the material specifics of how 
technologies are used to generate social order and how this order might be disobeyed, a specific 
approach to comparative studies of technologically mediated influence is necessary. Here we must 
note that we are not concerned with proposing a general definition of technology with respect to 
social structure, as Orlikowski does. We are interested specifically in technologies which are used 
as modes of influence and how this influence is achieved through material qualities. 
2.2 Positioning technology as a mode of exercising influence 
If technology is a non-reducible structure through which exercise can be influenced, technology-
mediated influence should be positioned alongside social structures as a distinct mode of influence 
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(Table 1). We start from Schimank’s distinction of three kinds of influence and the cross tabulation 
of kinds and modes of influence suggested by Gläser and Schimank (2014). From these 
suggestions, we construct a cross tabulation of three kinds of influence with an interactive, a 
structurally mediated, and technologically mediated mode of influence. Adding a technologically 
mediated mode of influence also made us notice slight inconsistencies in the work we build on, 
which made us reformulate some of the concepts.  
Table 1 Kinds and modes of influence 
Coercion is defined as influence based on force. However, the actual exercise of physical force 
remains a background threat in the overwhelming majority of interactive and structurally mediated 
coercion. People follow orders or prescribed rules for a variety of reasons. They may follow orders 
or rules as a matter of routine, because they believe them to be legitimate or necessary, because 
rule-following frees them from the necessity to make a decision, or because they know that force 
may be applied if they do not comply. Force may be applied, e.g. when people are physically 
restrained (imprisoned) because they broke rules (laws). This actual application of force remains 
an exception, however, because people are successfully influenced by orders or prescribed rules. 
In contrast, physical force comes directly into play in technologically mediated coercion 
because technology can exercise physical influence. For example, a turnstile can physically prevent 
customers without ticket from traveling, while a rule against free riding on public transport makes 
travel without ticket possible but would result in a penalty to be paid (with the payment ultimately 
being enforced by law).  
The second kind of influence, inducement, differs from coercion in that it is symmetrical and 
more manifest. It is symmetrical because rewards can be provided or withdrawn. Rewards also 
have to be provided or withdrawn in order to influence behaviour. The mere promise respectively 
 Kind of influence 
coercion inducement initiating re-
interpretation 
Mode of 
influence 
Interactive Order Reward Communication 
Mediated by 
structures 
Prescriptive 
rules 
Arranged reward 
procedures 
Arranged belief 
systems 
Mediated by 
technology 
Material 
restraint  
Materially 
programmed 
rewards 
Materialised 
provision of 
information or 
references to values 
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threat to do so has limited effects. Rewards include physical rewards such as pleasure, material 
rewards such as resources and, most frequently, money, and immaterial rewards such as recognition 
or information. They can be used interactively or through arranged procedures such as competitions 
for a reward or a performance-based pay scheme. 
Reward procedures can also be materially programmed. A common example for negative 
inducement through technology would be an alarm clock that is becoming louder if the user does 
not switch it off. Another example are the many computer games that reward successful players 
with ‘boni’. This example also illustrates why programmed reward procedures are largely linked 
to information technology. For this mode of technologically mediated influence to operate, the 
user’s behaviour must be monitored and a feedback must be programmed. 
The third kind of influence was called ‘persuasion’ by Schimank and was excluded from the 
cross tabulation by Gläser and Schimank (2014) because it played no role in their discussion of 
autonomy. We renamed this kind of influence as initiating re-interpretation in order to express more 
clearly what it does, namely providing information that makes actors re-interpret their situation and 
change their goals accordingly. More precisely, the information provided is intended to change 
links between an actor’s knowledge and values, e.g. by informing them that smoking endangers 
their (highly valued) health or by making actors aware of links between their knowledge about a 
situation (e.g. a natural disaster) and their values (e.g. solidarity).  
The examples illustrate that a re-interpretation does not change an actor’s situation but only 
the way in which the actor sees it. This re-interpretation is initiated by the provision of information, 
which can occur interactively by communication. The structures mediating the initiation of re-
interpretation consist of arranged links between knowledge and values in belief systems. 
Technologically mediated persuasion occurs with any materialised provision of information, which 
range from simple signs telling people not to swim in a river because it is infested with crocodiles 
to recent information technology that provides information about its user’s exercise and calorie 
intake. 
The three kinds of influence do not operate separately and often cannot be as easily 
distinguished as the ideal types in Table 1 suggest. For example, superiors will try to convince their 
subordinates and only resort to giving orders because the former causes much less social tension 
than the latter. The argument will, however, be made in the shadow of a hierarchy that ultimately 
rests on force. Both actors know that issuing an order is possible, which implicitly or explicitly 
shapes the argument. Another hybrid case is the communication of information, which can function 
as a reward in an inducement or as information in a persuasion. Similarly, the three modes of 
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influence overlap in the exercise of influence, e.g. when orders refer to rules or communication 
includes references to belief systems or technologically stored information. 
The discussion of technologically mediated influence as a specific mode that exists for 
coercion, inducement and initiating re-interpretation demonstrated that the mediation of influence 
through technology is both sufficiently consistent and sufficiently different from structurally 
mediated influence to warrant its introduction as a distinct mode. However, an interesting 
peculiarity of technologically mediated influence should be mentioned. The case that is included 
as a possibility in the definition of influence - that the implementation of behavioural interests does 
not contradict the interests of the addressees – is common and even predominant in technologically 
mediated influence. For example, the Berlin key analysed by Latour (1994) implements 
behavioural expectations only against the interests of those users whose interest is not to lock the 
door behind them, while its influence coincides with the interests of all users who want to lock the 
door behind them anyway. More generally, most users want to use a technology for the purpose for 
which it was designed in the ways intended by the designer, and are only influenced against their 
interests when these interests suggest a mode of use that deviates from that purpose. However, we 
consider the specific case of influence against the interests of the user as a useful model situation 
from which dimensions for the comparative description of technology can be derived.  
2.3 Technologically mediated influence is exercised through scripts 
How can the mediation of influence by technology be analysed? We think that the concept ‘script’ 
is best suited to the task. The concept has been introduced in STS in the early 1990s (Akrich 1992).3 
It addresses one of the field’s main concerns, namely the conceptualisation of the agency of 
artefacts in situations of distributed action. Akrich’s notion of the script draws on the semiotic ANT 
model of material agency and inscriptions developed by Callon (1986), Latour (1987) and Woolgar 
(1991), where de-, pre-, trans-, con-, or pro-scriptions of many kinds have been used to analyse the 
complex interrelations of humans and non-humans in ANT (Akrich and Latour 1992). 
Creating a script means shaping the materiality of an artefact in a way that specifies how it is 
to be used for a particular purpose. The effectiveness of this prescription is due to the artefact’s 
material features. This relationship lies at the heart of all possible ways of speaking of an artefact’s 
agency (or the distribution of an action between human actor and artefact). The artefact’s 
                                                 
3 Our notion of scripts focusses on scripts that are incorporated in technologies in order to shape actions. It does not 
extend to cognitive notions of scripts as “knowledge of stereotyped event sequences” (Abelson 1981: 715) or as 
“cognitive organization” (Fulk 1993: 922) nor to other sociological notions of scripts as “behavioural regularities“ 
(Barley and Tolbert 1997: 98) or as widely shared “scripts for activity” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000: 111). 
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materiality makes it possible for designers of scripts to exercise influence on unknown others across 
space and time. The concept ‘script’ thus links designers, users and use situation:  
“Designers (..) define actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, 
political prejudice, and the rest, and they assume that morality, technology, science, 
and economy will evolve in particular ways. A large part of the work of innovators 
is that of 'inscribing' this vision of (or prediction about) the world in the technical 
content of the new object. I will call the end product of this work a 'script' or a 
'scenario'. The technical realization of the innovator's belief about the relationship 
between an object and its surroundings actors is thus an attempt to predetermine the 
setting that users are asked to imagine for a particular piece of technology and the 
pre-scriptions (notices, contracts advices, etc.) that accompany it. (...) Thus like a 
film script, technical objects define a framework of action together with the actors 
and the space in which they are supposed to act” (Akrich 1992: 208). 
According to this definition, the material inscription is not only a programme of action that is pre-
defined and materialised but also prescribes the possibilities of use (and thus of user behavior), the 
basic features of use situation, and not least the user herself.  
Akrich advices caution not to understand scripts in a deterministic way (ibid). We see three 
specific reasons the use of technology often deviates from scripts. First, assuming that a script’s 
prescription is identical to later user behaviour reduces the material arrangements to mere 
instrumental means to human ends, thereby neglecting the ways in which the means-at-hand 
contribute to shaping the ends-in-view of users (Dewey 1939: 33-50). Second, it underemphasises 
the subversive power of users in processes of adoption and appropriation (Oudshoorn and Pinch 
2003). Third, a technology’s scripts are rarely unequivocal. A technology usually contains multiple 
scripts, which address different interactions with devices and may be more or less overt 
(Jarzabkowski and Pinch 2013). 
These three limitations must be taken into account when the use of technology is studied. For 
the purposes of our analysis, we nevertheless take scripts as representing influence, namely the 
attempt to change behaviour. That these attempts are successful only to a limited extend is not a 
peculiarity of technological scripts but something they have in common with interactions and social 
structures. Still, for a study of technologically mediated influence it is not necessary that scripts 
always exercise the influence successfully. The common use of most technologies routinely 
executes their scripts, which is sufficient for our purposes.  
The concept of scripts is not new in STS but its potential has not yet been fully developed. A 
‘script’ links several types of actors including a principal/sponsor, the designer, producers, in some 
cases actors implementing the technology, and users of technological artefacts. Linking actors in a 
specific way makes technological artefacts constitutive elements of social order. We take this cue 
from ANT but see the need to move beyond a reiteration of the argument that materiality does 
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matter by developing a comparative framework that captures how technological agency is realised 
differently in specific circumstances. 
2.4 Dimensions of influence and a comparative framework for scripts 
The positioning of technology in social theory as a mode of influence enables the application of 
the sociological repertoire to the task of constructing dimensions in which technologies as media 
for influence can be compared. We analyse the material inscription of user behaviour in a 
technology as a constellation of influence and derive dimensions from a sociological approach to 
the description of such constellations. The elementary situation in which influence is exercised – 
ego influences alter – varies in several dimensions, which describe the two actors, the process of 
influencing, and the situation in which the process is embedded. Table 2 details these dimensions 
for influence in general and specifies them for the comparison of scripts. Owing to the complexity 
of constellations of (technologically mediated) influence, the dimensions have nominal scales of 
different states rather than ranks or quantitative values.  
To illustrate these dimensions we introduce an interpretation of the well-known case of the 
Berlin key, which was used by Latour to illustrate the ability to create a specific social order via 
the design of a simple artefact (Latour 2000). The design of the key and the corresponding lock 
forces tenants to lock the door of the house behind them – they are only able to remove the key 
after they locked the door (Figure 1). Users unlock the door, slide the key through the keyhole, pass 
through the door, turn the key again (thereby locking the door again) and only then are able to 
retrieve it.  
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Figure 1 Berlin key and instructions for its use (source: adapted Figure 1.5. and 1.6 from Latour 
2000: 15-16) 
 
Dimensions of influence  Dimensions of scripts Application to Berlin key 
Addressees (properties of 
actors that make them 
targets of influence) 
Inscribed definition of 
user-group 
Accessibility of 
technology to different 
kinds of users 
User group:  
Tenants (perceived as 
unreliable by house owners) 
Tenants trained in key use 
Influencing actor (specificity 
of aims) 
Specificity of purpose of 
technology 
Highly specific purpose:  
Key use should effect closed 
door 
Kind of influence 
(enforcement-inducement-
persuasion) and strength 
Kind and strength of 
influence utilised by script 
Strong enforcement:  
Tenant is forced to close the 
door in order to keep the key 
Specificity of behavioural 
expectations 
Distribution of control 
over actions between user 
and artefact - flexibility of 
intended use 
Control over action resides in 
Berlin key: no flexibility of use 
Dynamics of influencing Homogeneity of 
distribution of control 
across script 
Patterns are homogeneous: 
every single step of using the 
key is completely determined 
by the design of the key-lock-
system 
Perceptibility of influence 
by addressees 
Visibility/Opacity of 
script and its purpose for 
users 
Script is highly visible because 
it is realised in the material 
form of the key-lock-system 
But only for skilled users, not 
telling for novices 
Situation in which influence 
is exercised 
Material aspects of the 
situation  
Embeddedness in larger 
scripts 
Script is a completely (and 
beyond possible dispute) 
mechanically realised part of 
the situation (form of notch 
and lip)  
Absence of alternative access 
(design and location of doors) 
Table 2 Aspects of influence, dimensions of scripts and application to the Berlin key case 
The first dimension in which the exercise of influence, and thus scripts, can be compared 
derived from the relational nature of influence as being based on ego’s behavioural expectation 
concerning alter. The addressee of a behavioural expectation is one of the fundamental features of 
a relationship of influence. In the case of influence through scripts, the addressees are those users 
of a technology that are to be influenced. Similar to preconditions set by structurally mediated 
influence (scope of rules, participants in competitions, or accessibility of systems of knowledge 
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and values), technology targets some users but not others. In the case of the Berlin key, the user 
considered is the person who needs to pass the door (the tenant). Tenants were perceived to be 
unreliable and frequently not to lock the door behind them, which is why they were given a special 
key. These users also need to know how the key has to be used/utilised.  
A second dimension describes ego’s aims concerning the behaviour of alter. The exercise of 
influence varies in the specificity of these aims that are to be achieved. The actor exercising 
influence may aim at a very specific outcome or at a rather broad range of effects. This dimension 
translates into the specificity of a technology. The specificity of the Berlin key’s purpose is very 
high because its only purpose is to create a situation in which the door is locked after its use.  
The third general dimension in which influence and thus scripts can vary is the kind and 
strength of influence. Kind and strength of influence are linked in a complex, non-hierarchical 
relationship. We would generally expect that coercion is a stronger influence than inducement, and 
inducement in turn stronger than initiating re-interpretation. However, the re-interpretation of a 
situation achieved by a belief system, e.g. of a religious cult, can produce an influence that is at 
least as strong as that achieved by coercion. We already demonstrated that all three kinds of 
influence can be inscribed in technology, which would then force users to behave in a particular 
way, reward them for such behaviour, or convince them that this behaviour is appropriate. The 
Berlin key is a clear example for influence via strong enforcement: The shapes of key and lock 
simply force key users to lock the door if they want to keep the key. 
The fourth dimension describes the specificity of the way in which the situation can be 
produced. The exercise of influence varies in the extent to which the actions of the addressee are 
specified. This is different from the second dimension because the aim may be highly specific but 
may be achieved in different ways (all roads lead to Rome). In the case of scripts, this dimension 
can be specified as the distribution of control over actions between the user and the technology 
because the distribution of control determines the flexibility of use. Technology may achieve its 
purpose only if the user exactly follows the script, it may ‘tolerate’ deviations from the script by 
users, or it may even require input from the user because the script cannot be fully specified in 
advance. The distribution of control inscribed in the Berlin key is one-sided and resides in the key. 
Users have no control over the way in which the key is used, which makes the key use very 
inflexible. If key users want to pass the door and take the key with them, they need to execute the 
script precisely as described in Figure 1. Thus, the range of a key user’s possible actions is highly 
restricted. 
The strength of influence can vary in the course of influencing - be it interactive, structurally 
mediated or technologically mediated. This possible variation is captured by the dimension 
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dynamics of influencing If the exercise of influence is not just an event but extends over time, the 
strength of an influence (and thus the addressee’s control over their action) can vary. Examples 
include occasional interventions of supervisors in the case of interactive influence and procedural 
rules that contain decision points for those following them. For technology, we specify this 
dimension as the distribution of control between technology and user over time, e.g. the 
homogeneity of that distribution across the script. In the case of the Berlin key, control is 
homogenously distributed and lies with the artefact throughout the execution of the script. In 
contrast, computer programs may ask the user to make decisions, thereby creating phases in which 
the user is active, followed by phases in which the user cannot interfere with the program. Such a 
phased script can also be constructed by spatial arrangements. A common example are IKEA stores 
which contain a path customers have to follow but also can cut short at certain points.  
The exercise of influence also varies in its perceptibility by addressees. Addressees might not 
recognise that they are influenced, might recognise it when it is too late, or might not recognise the 
influencing actor. Such a low perceptibility or opacity of influence is more likely when influence 
is structurally mediated, which already points to the opportunity to obscure influence by 
technology. The scripts of a technology may be more or less visible to the user. Users often know 
that they are scripted and what behaviour is expected of them when interacting with a technology. 
However, scripts may also be made invisible to the user in order to make users induce a specific 
behaviour that the user does not recognise or recognises too late. The visibility of the Berlin key’s 
script and its purpose for the user depend on user skills. Skilled users can easily see every detail of 
the script because it is materialised in the key’s form. However, for an unskilled user (like the 
anthropologist in Latour’s own description) the functioning of the Berlin Key is completely opaque. 
The script and the influence it has on the user, then, can only be perceived as inability to use the 
key at all, which makes it impossible to leave the house at night. 
A final dimension that must be taken into account by a comparative approach to influence is 
the embeddedness of influence in a more complex situation. Addressees of influences act in 
situations that are shaped by overlapping influences and other conditions of action. This situation 
contributes to shaping each individual influence. In the case of technologically mediated influence, 
this means that in addition to other actors and structurally mediated influences, particular attention 
must be paid to material properties of the situation in which a technology is used. For the Berlin 
key, the script is a completely mechanically realised part of a mundane micro-situation: The Berlin 
key (with its lip) functions exclusively with doors that have a respective locking mechanism and 
shape of the key hole (with its notch). Leaving the house and locking the door is only possible via 
a series of actions prescribed by form of notch and lip of the keys and form of the lock-system. 
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This of course has prerequisites in the larger surrounding of the situation: The script’s influence on 
key users depends on the existence of alternative ways of leaving or entering the house.  
3. Applications 
To illustrate the potential of our comparative approach, we apply it to two discussions of 
technologically mediated influence. First, we explore the dynamic relationship between inscribed 
and user influence by comparing types of ‘persuasive technologies’. Second, we ask how the 
increasing sophistication of technologies affects the autonomy of users. The comparisons of 
technologies in the two applications illustrate the potential of our approach to link analyses of 
technologies to each other and to guide empirical comparative studies.  
3.1 Making sense of “persuasive technologies” 
The fields of Human-Computer Interaction and Software Design also begun a discussion about the 
exercise of influence through computer systems. As in the techno-regulation debate, different forms 
of influence are distinguished. Fogg (2003) has drawn together several strands of this debate in a 
systematic account of “persuasive technology”, which he defines as “interactive computing 
systems designed to change people's attitudes and behaviors” (ibid: 1). Research on these 
technologies should, according to Fogg, focus “on endogenous intent, that is, the persuasive intent 
that is designed into a computing product” (ibid.: 17). This matches with the STS concept of scripts, 
although Fogg does not seem to know this research tradition.  
Fogg distinguishes between two approaches to behavioural change, namely persuasion and 
coercion: “It's important to note the difference between persuasion and coercion, terms that are 
sometimes confused. Coercion implies force; while it may change behaviors, it is not the same as 
persuasion, which implies voluntary change – in behavior, attitude, or both.” (ibid: 15).  
Among the persuasive technologies, Fogg distinguishes seven types. The basic understanding 
underlying the typology of persuasive computing technologies is a general assumption about how 
the designer’s intentions can be transferred into a technological incentive for the users: “The 
research on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation shows that the gentler the intervention to achieve the 
desired behavior change, the better the long-term outcome” (ibid.: 54). This abstract notion of 
“gentleness” appears to be the dimension in which the types are distinguished. Unfortunately, this 
abstraction removes the properties of the technological designs from the comparison. More 
importantly, Fogg’s statement and typology suggest that in order to comparatively analyse 
technologies’ impact on behaviour, it is sufficient to project their complex properties on just one 
dimension.  
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We test Fogg’s implicit hypothesis by applying our comparative approach to his types of 
persuasive technology and the corresponding empirical examples (Table 3). All technologies are 
widely accessible to users because they are intended to change everyday behaviour. The specificity 
of the technologies’ purposes is also high for all seven types. However, we find important variation 
in the kinds and strength of influence utilised by technologies belonging to the seven types. The 
“persuasive technologies” discussed by Fogg utilise all three kinds of influence. “Reduction 
technology” reduces the number of steps that must be taken to reach a goal. One-click shopping is 
a reduction technology that enables the user to pay by credit card and initiate delivery by just one 
click of the computer mouse because all other necessary steps (e.g. confirming mode of payment, 
decisions on billing address and delivery address, decision on mode of shipping) are pre-
programmed and will be made automatically. This is much easier than pursuing these goals without 
reduction technology. Thus, reduction technologies are cases of inscribed inducement, which is 
widely accessible, highly specific, and visible. The control of the action is largely inscribed, too, 
and the script is homogenous. Once the user triggered the technology, they yield control to it. 
Reduction technologies are usually part of larger scripts and simplify certain steps of those.  
In contrast, “tunnelling technology”, defined as “leading users through a predetermined 
sequence of actions or events, step by step” (ibid.: 34), clearly uses coercion in both our and in 
Fogg’s understanding of the concept. For example, a software installation programme requires 
decisions and inputs from the user at some defined points but inevitably guides the user to a highly 
specific outcome – the software is installed, user information is transmitted to the firm providing 
the software, and so on. The user can follow the steps of the script and reach the goal, or quit the 
script and abandon the goal. The user “becomes a captive audience. If users wish to remain in the 
tunnel, they must accept, or at least confront, the assumptions, values, and logic of the controlled 
environment” (ibid: 36). The scripts have highly specific purposes and are heterogeneous in that 
phases of user inputs, followed by phases in which the technology controls the process. Tunnelling 
scripts are often intransparent and part of larger scripts. 
“Tailoring technology” provides information tailored to the interests of individual users (see 
ibid: 37pp). An example is the website http://aqicn.org, where users can obtain information about 
the air pollution in their city. The information is ‘tailored’ to their location. The type “suggestion 
technology” is a more specific version of this, namely “an interactive computing product that 
suggests a behaviour at the most opportune moment” (ibid: 41), i.e. in a very specific situation. An 
example of suggestion technology are speed meters that show drivers their actual speed, thereby 
providing them with information that might make them adhere to the speed limit. Tailoring and 
suggestion technologies have in common that they inscribe an initiation of re-interpretation because 
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the technologies do nothing except providing additional information for the specific situation of 
use as opportunities or possible choices unknown to the user without the technological 
augmentation of information at hand. The specificity of purposes inscribed may vary. The 
technologies are homogenous in that the control lies with the technology. Users may select which 
information they want to receive, but beyond that they have no influence on the measurement 
process, which is often opaque to them. 
“Self-monitoring technology” – e.g. a bracelet that shows users their current heart-rate - does 
not only provide information but also an incentive: “The goal is to eliminate the tedium of 
measuring and tracking performance or status” (ibid: 44). The heart rate monitor induces the users 
because it allows them to adapt their exercise level to a target heart rate. Thus, “self-monitoring” 
combines initiating re-interpretation with inducement. The technologies are often highly specific 
and control most of the action. They are, however, heterogeneous because the user has choices 
concerning the configuration of measurements. 
 “Surveillance technology” is defined by Fogg as “any computing technology that allows one 
party to monitor the behavior of another to modify behavior in a specific way” (ibid: 46). In the 
example of the HygieneGuard, a technology which monitors the time of employees spent with 
washing hands after using the toilet, according to Fogg is effective simply because the employees 
know that they are surveilled and this “„increases the likelihood of a desired outcome“ (ibid: 46). 
‘Users’ of the technology are watched and change their interpretation of the situation – it is no 
longer a private one. This initiation of re-interpretation is utilised in a situation of rule-based 
coercion.4 The surveillance technologies discussed by Fogg are highly specific – they target just 
one type of ‘user’ behaviour. They are also homogenous and leave the ‘user’ with no possibility to 
control. Their effect depends on the script’s visibility (which is different for other surveillance 
technologies). The technologies are widely ‘accessible’ because  
                                                 
4 This embeddedness of surveillance in situations of coercion points to an aspect of technologically mediated influence 
we already mentioned (see above, section 2.3), namely the necessity to distinguish between kinds of users. The 
distinction between users who implement a technology and users who are just subjugated to it is of particular 
importance when surveillance technologies are discussed. 
23 
 
Dimensions of scripts Reduction 
(e.g. one-click shopping) 
Tunnelling 
(e.g. software installation) 
Tailoring / Suggestion  
(e.g. tailored 
commercials) 
Self-Monitoring  
(e.g. heart rate monitor) 
Surveillance  
(e.g. workplace 
surveillance) 
Conditioning  
(e.g. rewards in computer 
games) 
Accessibility of 
technology to different 
kinds of users 
Widely accessible to 
computer users 
Widely accessible to 
computer users 
Widely accessible to 
computer users, 
limited choice 
concerning interaction 
Widely accessible to 
users 
Widely used, 
limited choice 
concerning 
interaction 
Widely accessible to 
computer users 
Specificity of purpose of 
technology 
High – one specific 
intended outcome 
High – one specific intended 
outcome 
Varies from supporting a 
wide range of choices to 
eliciting specific actions 
Often high – one 
specific kind of 
information provided 
High High – one specific 
intended outcome 
Kind and strength of 
influence utilised by 
script 
Inducement Coercion Persuasion Initiating re-
interpretation 
Inducement 
Initiating re-
interpretation 
Inducement 
Distribution of control 
of actions between user 
and artifact – flexibility 
of intended use 
Most of the action is 
controlled by technology 
Most of the action is 
controlled by technology, 
user has predefined choices 
Controlled by 
technology  
Most of the action is 
controlled by 
technology, user has 
predefined choices 
Controlled by 
technology 
Most of the action is 
controlled by technology 
Homogeneity of 
distribution of control 
Heterogeneous (user 
action followed by 
action of technology), 
collapsed into two steps 
Heterogeneous – limited 
choices by users 
intersperse operation of 
technology 
Homogenous scripts, 
addressees have no 
choice 
Heterogeneous – 
limited choices by users 
intersperse operation of 
technology 
Homogenous 
scripts, addressees 
have no choice 
Heterogeneous (user 
action is ‘rewarded’ by 
technology) 
Visibility/ Opacity of 
the script and its 
purpose for users 
Visible Script often invisible Often opaque Mostly transparent Visible Visible 
Material aspects of the 
situation, embeddedness 
in larger scripts 
Used to simplify steps in 
larger scripts  
Used to force user through 
steps in larger scripts 
Integrated by users in 
their situations 
Situation-specific high-
specificity tailoring is 
suggestion 
Embedded in plans to 
change own behaviour 
Embedded in 
situations of 
structurally 
mediated coercion  
Used in larger scripts for 
changing user behaviour 
(inscribing of changed 
behaviour in users) 
Table 3: Comparison of Fogg’s persuasive technologies 
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 ‘users’ don’t have a choice about ‘using’ them. 
The type “conditioning technology” is defined as a “computerised system that uses principles 
of operant conditioning to change behavior” (ibid.: 49) or as “computing technology [that uses] 
positive reinforcement to […] transform existing behaviors into habits” (ibid.: 53). The 
technologies use inducement by providing programmed rewards for specific types of behaviour. 
They are widely accessible and highly specific. In most cases, a very specific action of a user is 
rewarded. Scripts are heterogeneous in that users need to perform operations in order to be 
rewarded by the technology. However, the control lies mainly with the technology. The script needs 
to be visible in order to be effective. It is important to stress here that conditioning technology is 
used to permanently change user behaviour by creating habits or even addictions, in other words: 
to inscribe a specific behaviour in users. 
 Our comparison shows that linking the effectiveness of persuasion technologies to 
“gentleness” is a rather strong reduction of complexity and might not lead to a sufficient 
understanding of what persuasion with computer technologies does. Applying the dimensions for 
the comparison of scripts can clarify and conceptually deepen the understanding of the principle 
mechanisms that enable the exercise of influence on users via the design of technology. 
Furthermore, applying the dimensions of scripts clearly reveals that the concept of “persuasive 
technology” is multidimensional in principle.  
3.2 Increasing levels of activity and the distribution of influence: Airport security technology5 
The rapid development of technology and particularly information technologies is reflected in the 
sociology of technology by references to increasing “degrees of sophistication”, “autonomy”, 
“agency”, or “level of activity” of technology. However, there is no agreement on the consequences 
of these trends for human actors. On one pole of the spectrum there is the position that increased 
sophistication narrows the room of manoeuvre of human actors. For example, in their study on the 
governance of a container terminal, Weyer and Cramer conclude:  
The increasing autonomy of technology corresponds to a change in the status of the 
human actor. The opaqueness of processes constrains the ability of human actors to 
implement their strategies by exploiting options and rooms of manoeuvre provided 
by technology. The human actor becomes the passive observer of a system which he 
understands less and less well. He must adapt his behaviour to the machine and is 
increasingly forced into passive-reactive, adaptive behaviour. (Weyer and Cramer 
2007: 279, our translation)  
This position is also often voiced in held surveillance studies (e.g. Introna and Wood 2004). On the 
other pole of this spectrum, increased sophistication of technology is seen as widening the scope 
                                                 
5 This section draws on a comparative empirical study of security technologies (Schäufele 2017). 
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of human action. For example, Rammert introduces a conceptual distinction of consecutive “levels 
of technical agency”, namely “passive”, “semi-active”, “re-active”, “pro-active” and “co-
operative” (Rammert 2008: 69) and claims: 
„The higher the inherent level of agency of technological elements, the more the 
relation between humans, technical means and signifying objects shifts from simple 
instrumentality to manifold interactivity” (Rammert 2009: 26, our translation) 
These very general arguments come with little, if any, empirical substantiation. This is not 
surprising because empirically linking degrees of sophistication or levels of technical agency to the 
range of possible actions of users would require systematic comparisons of a larger number of 
technologies, for which there is no methodological support. We test the fruitfulness of our 
framework by comparing three airport security technologies which have a similar purpose, namely 
detecting dangerous objects: the Walkthrough Metal Detector, the X-ray scanner for luggage, and 
the relatively new technology of the body scanner.  
We focus our analysis on the airport security personnel who daily operate these machines as 
users whose behaviour is scripted. The behaviour of passengers is scripted to some extent, too – 
they have to move through the machines or handle their luggage in specified ways. However, their 
status vis-à-vis the technology is closer to that of an object than a user. Security officers check 
luggage and passengers by operating security technologies. These technologies provide certain 
information and indicate a certain action, which are prescribed as mandatory by the rules that are 
part of the sociotechnical arrangement in which the technologies are embedded.  
Walkthrough Metal Detectors at airports were designed to search for concealed metal weapons 
on a person's body. Built like a door, with sensors in the frame, detectors raise an alarm if metal of 
a certain specified amount or density comes near the sensors. The alarm consists of a sound and a 
visual indicator (a small display with red and green LED lamps). The machine’s signal induces a 
very clear action, namely manual checking of the passenger by the security officer. The script 
consists of a ‘ready’ signal by the detector, followed by the security officer’s invitation for a 
passenger to walk through the detector and a manual check by the security if the detector gives a 
signal. 
X-ray luggage scanner at airport security checkpoints are used to check unopened pieces of 
hand luggage. All items that pass through the scanner are screened and a multi-coloured image of 
the luggage is produced and displayed to the user. Orange indicates organic, green non-organic, 
and blue very dense materials (probably metal, hard plastic or alloy). This image needs 
interpretation by the scanner’s user. Therefore, the security officer analyses the image for being 
'suspicious' or 'dangerous' and marks them as 'needs follow-up check by hand' and thus induces 
further actions. If the picture is ambiguous, the security officer has the opportunity to move the belt 
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backwards and re-scan the luggage. In contrast to the Walkthrough Metal Detector, the luggage 
scanner has no inscribed selection of things 'suspicious' or 'dangerous'. Rather it is a shared activity: 
the machine provides a signal (a detailed image), this signal must always be interpreted by a human. 
The Body Scanner has similar functions as the Walkthrough Metal Detector, namely finding 
dangerous objects on a person’s body. It produces a whole-body image of passengers in order to 
detect any object that is not part of the human body. The user first must provide an initial input 
about the basic form of the human body to be analysed - male or female - so that the machine knows 
the underlying norm of its calculations. When it is ready, and a person is invited in, the machine 
analyses the scan data and generates an abstract image of the person. In contrast to the luggage 
scan, the analysis occurs completely autonomous. The final output consists of an abstract picture 
of a human body, on which red markings indicate where potentially dangerous objects were 
detected. 
The three technologies vary in their degree of sophistication and their levels of technical 
agency: The metal detector just visualises a sensor signal, the X-Ray luggage scanner provides an 
image that is then analysed by a human operator, and the body scanner visualises a sensor signal, 
analyses the image and provides an interpretation. In terms of Rammert’s levels of agency, the 
metal detector is semi-active, the X-Ray luggage scanner is re-active because it uses images as 
input in a feed-back loop, and the body scanner is pro-active because it uses automated image 
analysis. For a further comparison of the three technologies we utilise the script dimensions 
developed before (Table 4).  
The accessibility of all three technologies is restricted to authorised personnel, namely the 
security staff at the airport. However, the technologies differ in the skills of the users that are 
necessary for operating the technologies. While the Metal Detector and the Body Scanner require 
only minimum skills, the X-ray Scanner demands a higher level of training. Users must learn how 
to interpret the X-ray images.  
The purpose of the technology is highly specific for all three technologies in that dangerous 
items need to be detected and removed from the secured area. The kind of influence exercised is 
initiating re-interpretation in all three cases. The technology produces an output that can be 
translated into simple decisions about subsequent actions. The strength of the influence varies 
because the information provided is linked to different rules in the socio-technical situations (see 
below).  
The distribution of control of action again varies between the three technologies. Users of the 
metal detector and the body scanner have very little control. Their actions are restricted to pushing 
buttons. In contrast, the X-ray machine gives its users significant control because they decide (after 
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the interpretation of the image) whether to re-scan the luggage, let it pass, or direct it to additional 
checks. Correspondingly, the homogeneity of distribution of control is high for the metal detector 
and for the body scanner because in both cases users only start the technology and respond to its 
signals. In the case of the X-ray machine, control oscillates between the user and the machine 
because after interpreting the image, the user can initiate a re-scan or decide that further action is 
necessary depending on the image provided by the machine.  
All three scripts are transparent insofar as the technology’s purpose is straightforward and 
clear input-output relations exist. However, certain elements of the configuration are opaque. The 
Walkthrough metal detector disguises the level of sensor sensitivity. The luggage scanner contains 
‘false images’ that are included by superiors to test the actions of their security staff. The body 
scanner is opaque in terms of the automated image analysis. 
The material aspects of the situation concern only the body scanner, whose correct functioning 
depends on passengers to conform to body norms concerning sex, height and corpulence, which 
are inscribed into the automated analysis of the scan data. An important aspect of the three 
technologies’ embeddedness in larger scripts is the institutional context of airport security. The 
airport security regime defines strong obligations for all passengers to pass the checks. With regard 
to the airport security personnel in their role as users of the three technologies, coercion, occurs as 
a combined effect of technology and the institutional setting in which it is embedded. The 
obligation of always taking action in response to specific signals produced by the machines is 
inscribed in the institutional setting, i.e. the legal regulations, rules governing work, and 
organizational hierarchies. A major difference between the X-ray Scanner and the two other 
technologies is that the users of the former has a degree of freedom because they need to interpret 
the picture as indicating something dangerous before responding with the prescribed action.  
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Dimensions of scripts Walk through Metal 
Detector (1) 
X-ray machine (2) Body scanner (3) 
Accessibility of 
technology to 
different kinds of 
users 
Easy handling, 
minimal training 
required 
Training for image 
interpretation necessary 
Easy handling, 
minimal training 
required 
Usage limited to authorised personnel 
Specificity of 
purpose of 
technology 
very high: avoid dangerous items and materials in secured area 
Kind and strength of 
influence utilised by 
script 
Initiating re-interpretation: user decision based on signal/image 
provided by the machine 
Distribution of 
control of actions 
between user and 
artifact – flexibility 
of intended use 
Strongly prescribed technological process 
User has little 
control (only 
decision: when to 
start technology) 
User has significant 
control 
User has little 
control (only 
decision: when to 
start technology) 
Homogeneity of 
distribution of 
control 
Stronlgy 
homogeneous  
(no control after the 
technology is started) 
 
Heterogeneous  
(operation of technology 
interspersed with user 
decisions) 
Strongly 
homogeneous 
(no control after the 
technology is started) 
Visibility/ Opacity of 
the script and its 
purpose for users 
Transparent purpose, 
opaque concerning 
sensitivity 
Transparent purpose, 
opaque because of 
random test images 
Transparent purpose, 
opaque concerning 
the criteria of the 
automated image 
analysis 
Material aspects of 
the situation, 
embeddedness in 
larger scripts 
 Passengers need to 
fulfil body norms to be 
processed correctly 
Embedded in a 
coercive setting of 
airport security that 
prescribes responses 
to signals 
Embedded in a coercive 
setting of airport 
security that prescribes 
responses to 
interpretations of 
images  
Embedded in a 
coercive setting of 
airport security that 
prescribes responses 
to signals  
Table 4: Comparison of the scripts of two technologies for airport security (important variations 
are set bold) 
Our analysis enables us to answer the question whether the increasing sophistication of 
technology increases or decreases the room of manoeuvre of human actors. The level of 
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sophistication – the amount and complexity of information processed and of information provided 
by the technology - is lowest for the metal detector, higher for the X-Ray scanner and highest for 
the body scanner. The levels of technological agency vary accordingly. However, ‘degree of 
sophistication’ or ‘level of agency’ are mono-dimensional descriptors of quite complex phenomena. 
Using our comparative framework, we could decompose these complex variables and show that 
although the three scripts are identical or very similar in many dimensions, they vary in the 
accessibility to users, distribution of control, and homogeneity of this distribution across the script. 
Owing to these differences, users’ room of manoeuvre is lower for the metal detector than for the 
X-Ray scanner but higher for the X-Ray scanner than for the body scanner. This demonstrates that 
both hypotheses quoted in the beginning are too simple, and that there is no deterministic 
connection between ‘levels’ of technology and action opportunities of the user. With our 
multidimensional script analysis, we could show the reasons for this. Accessibility, Distribution of 
control and Homogeneity of Distribution of control vary independently of the level of 
sophistication. The level of influence neither increases nor decreases in a linear way. 
4. Discussion: Where did we leave materiality? 
An apparent discrepancy in our framework is that although we emphasised the importance of 
materiality in our reasoning for technologically mediated influence as a distinct form, we did not 
include a comparative dimension for it. We think that this discrepancy points to an important 
obstacle for comparative science and technology studies. Social studies of science and technology 
have no means for reducing the complexity of material properties. The natural and engineering 
sciences have developed theories at various levels of abstraction, which successfully reduce the 
complexity of material properties for their purposes. However, these reductions are not useful for 
social science investigations of materiality. Attempts to reduce the complexity of material 
properties in social studies of science and technology have led to highly general conceptualisations 
such as “The Mangle of Practice” (Pickering 1995) or ANT’ use of sociological concepts (interests, 
speaker, enrolment, or power) that emphasise the role of materiality but abstract from its specific 
properties. The necessary move to a very high level of abstraction for reducing the complexity 
creates the dichotomy between conceptualisations and idiosyncratic descriptions of materiality we 
discussed in the introduction. 
Faced with the problem of irreducible complexity, we choose a different approach. Instead of 
trying to include materiality directly in our comparative framework, we included the ways in which 
it influences human action, i.e. materialised scripts. Our main argument is that it is the way in which 
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influence is materially inscribed that produces a specific accessibility to users, specificity of 
purpose, distribution of control, kind and strength of influence used, homogeneity of distribution 
of control, visibility of the script and embeddedness in situations. By comparing scripts in these 
dimensions, we compare the influence that is exercised on humans through the materiality of 
technology, which is what matters to social studies of science and technology (see Gläser and 
Laudel 2015 for a corresponding suggestion for science studies).  
At the same time, the study of materiality through scripts confers a specific openness to our 
comparative framework. Any comparative framework is open in the sense of its dimensions not 
being equally important in all comparisons. Depending on the aim of a comparative study, some 
dimensions may be relevant while others aren’t. However, the specific role of materiality adds a 
particular flexibility to the framework. It is possible that particular forms of materiality exploited 
by scripts may also affect the composition of the comparative framework by requiring additional 
comparative dimensions. Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the inclusion of 
comparative dimensions directly referring to materiality might be required ad hoc for some 
comparisons.  
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this article is to further comparative studies of technologically mediated influence by 
theoretically positioning this kind of influence, deriving a comparative framework for 
technologically mediated influence and demonstrating that applying this framework can contribute 
new insights in the complexities of technologically mediated influence. Barring the application of 
the framework in a dedicated comparative empirical investigation, we could only deliver a ‘proof 
of concept’ by revisiting recurrent questions in technology studies and related fields. Nevertheless, 
we delivered this proof of concept by demonstrating the four possible functions of comparative 
frameworks for technologically mediated influence. First, we used a comparison of Fogg’s seven 
‘persuasive technologies’ and of three airport security technologies to demonstrate that the 
framework can connect case studies of technologies. Second, the detailed comparisons illustrated 
how the framework could be used to guide comparative studies by focusing empirical attention on 
particular properties of scripts and thus technologies. Since the comparisons informed the 
discussion of 'middle-range’ theoretical claims, they also suggested how comparative studies could 
increase the theoretical yield of studies of technologies. Third, by revealing the complexity behind 
Fogg’s concept of ‘persuasive technologies’, we demonstrated how techno-regulation studies could 
benefit from specific, theoretically guided comparisons. Finally, we positioned technologically 
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mediated influence in a social-theoretical framework. This enables specific comparisons between 
interactive, structurally mediated, and technologically mediated influence.  
Among these affordances of our comparative framework, we find its potential contribution to 
the new studies of behavioural regulation through computer-based technologies particularly 
intriguing, and would like to elaborate them as an outlook on future work. A repeated argument in 
the discussion on techno-regulation is that technology is an easier means than law to enforce rules 
(Lessig 1999; Koops 2008; Hildebrandt 2009; Leenes 2011). This argument is akin to Latour’s 
(1991b) more general argument about the primacy of technology in stabilising society. An 
illustrative example for that is the rule to fasten the seat belt, which is used by several techno-
regulation scholars (Lessig 2006: 130; Hildebrandt 2009: 453-454; Yeung 2011: 3) and Latour 
(1992). Car drivers can or cannot follow the rule to fasten the seatbelt. If they don’t they might be 
punished. In modern cars, technology can check the compliance with the rule and react with signs, 
annoying sounds, or blocking the engine unless the seatbelt is fastened.  
In Algorithm studies, Ziewitz (2016b) found a common “structure of concerns”, namely that 
of a drama in two distinct acts. “The first act introduces algorithms as powerful and consequential 
actors in a wide variety of domains.” (ibid: 5). The second act discusses the difficulties involved in 
explaining how algorithms exercise influence (ibid: 6). Ziewitz then continues by identifying “three 
analytic themes that figure prominently in the algorithmic drama: agency, inscrutability, and 
normativity.” (ibid: 7). Interestingly enough, algorithm studies appear to follow the same pattern 
of abstract discussion, idiosyncratic case study, and use of 'sample technologies’ (see the 
contributions in Ziewitz 2016a). 
Both lines of thinking can benefit from systematic comparisons of technologies, be it to other 
technologies or to other forms of exercising influence. Techno-regulation would benefit from 
moving beyond the merely illustrative use of examples and executing detailed comparisons of 
techno- and rule-regulation, thereby extending our knowledge about the ways in which human 
behaviour is regulated in particular circumstances through specific mechanisms of influence with 
specific effects. If this isn’t done, the rather fundamental statements concerning social order and 
freedom cannot be empirically substantiated beyond anecdotal evidence. Algorithm studies could 
use comparisons to address the questions of agency, inscrutability and normativity by applying a 
comparative framework to the study of algorithms. We believe to have demonstrated that at least 
some of the inscrutability can be done away with by such a framework. 
Social studies of technology address one of the central concerns of modern societies and social 
science, namely the influence on human behaviour that is exercised through technology. In society, 
democratic representatives, the law, political and economic interest groups and the general public 
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increasingly notice and debate the ways in which technology is used to influence behaviour. In 
philosophy, political theory, law, sociology, computer science and many other fields the emerging 
opportunities of technologically mediated influence and the new conceptual problems arising from 
them are discussed. This creates an increasing demand for contributions from science and 
technology studies. 
We believe that these new societal and scientific concerns need to be addressed not only 
conceptually but also by empirical research, and that one contribution science and technology 
studies can make is methodological. The question how technologically mediated influence can be 
studied gains urgency. For an effective contribution by science and technology studies, we must go 
beyond the ‘odd couple’ of empirical description and fundamental statements. This is why we 
proposed a comparative framework that supports ‘middle-range’ generalisations by enabling 
comparisons of technologies as well as comparisons of technologically mediated influence to other 
forms of influence. Both kinds of comparison will help to position technology more firmly in social 
theory.  
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